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NOTE AND COMMENT 
JAMtS H. BRtWS'ttR.-Thousands of alumni and former students of the 
Law School will learn with deep regret of the sudden death of Professor 
Brewster in Denver, Colorado, on October 7, 1920. 
Professor Brewster was born in New Haven, Connecticut, April 6, 1856, 
the son of Rev. Joseph and Sarah Bunce Brewster. He was educated at the 
Hopkins Grammar School and New Haven public schools and was graduated 
with the degree of Ph.B. from Sheffield Scientific School, Yale, 1877, and 
from the Law School of the same University with the degree of LL.B. in 
l87g. From 1883 to 1897 he practiced law in Detroit at which place, on June 
28, 1888, he was married to Miss Frances Stanton. In 1897 he was made 
Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, and from 1903 until the 
severance of his connection with the Law School in 1910 as a re.suit of ill 
health, he was Editor-in-Chief of this Review. His well-known book, 
BRtwsTtR ONi CoNVtYANCING, was the result of his work and lectures on that 
subject in the Law School. After recovering, in a measure, his health, Pro-
fessor Brewster taught for a time in the Law School of the University of 
Colorado. For several years, however, he had been in the active practice of 
his profession in Denver. 
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Former students of Professor Brewster will remember him for his broad 
interests, his geniality, and kindness. As a teacher of law, he was remark-
able in his clearness of thought and expression: Members of the student 
editorial board of this Review during the period covered by his editorship, 
who came into much closer contact with him than did the student body gen-
erally, ov.:e him a great deal for his stimulating personality and scholarship. 
PR:r<$ REGULATION UND!tR TH:i;: PoLict Powa-A recent Indiana law pro-
viding for the regulation of prices at which all coal moving in intra-state 
commerce in the state may be sold, has just received the sanction of the 
District Court of the United States for the District of Indiana." The case 
arose upon a bill of complaint filed by one of the operating companies to 
enjoin the commission created by the Act from entering upon any of its 
duties. Several aspects of the bill were deemed by the court to be premature 
but the vital point in controversy was adjudicated, namely, as to whether or 
not the state has any power at all to regulate profits arising from the industry. 
In denying the injunction and dismissing the bill the court added one more 
to the already large number of "businesses affected with the public interest" 
of which phrase the Supreme Court of the United States has said, "We can 
best explain by examples."" Inasmuch as the opinion was rendered by a court 
consisting of two circuit judges and one district judge it would seem to be 
entitled to ~lmost if not qUite as niuch weight as though rendered by a Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
The phrase "business affected with the public interest~' was first' used in 
ibis country in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Waite in the i::ase of 
.Munn v. Illinois," decided in 1876, holding that the business of storing grain 
:in elevators was so affected and is there quoted from an old treatise' of Lord 
-Chief Justice Hale. As applied in that and succeeding cases it has seemed 
to mean no more than this, that there are certain classes of businesses which 
may be regulated by the state to a greater extent than others to which the 
term "purely private" has been applied. No precise test has so far been laid 
down by. the Supreme Court by means of which the limits of these two classes 
can be distinguished. The attitude thus far steadfastly adhered to by the 
Court may be illustrated by the following quotation from its most important 
recent decision upon the point, German Alliance J11s11rance Co. v. Lewis.' 
After reviewing at length the cases. following Munn v. Illinois, supra, the 
court commented upon the group as a whole as follows : "The cases need 
no explanatory or fortifying comment. They demonstrate that a business, 
by circumstances and its nature, may rise from private to be of public con-
cern, and be subject, in consequence, to governmental regulation. * .. ,. 
'The underlying principle is that business of certain kinds holds such a peculiar 
1 American Coal Mining Ctt. v. The Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana, 
# al, -- Fed. -- (Sept. 6, 1920). 
•German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, a33 U. S. 389. 
I 94 U. S. II3. 
'DE P011.nBl1s MAius, I HARG. L. T. R. 78. 
I 233 U. S. 389. 
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Tclation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of 
public regulation.'" In order to arrive at a conclusion, as to the nature of 
this "peculiar relation," which will constitute a basis for formulating a re-
liable test as to when it exists, it is important to review briefly the historical 
-development of governmental price regulation. 
Businesses of all descriptions were regulated during the Middle Ages and 
later during our OWIJ colonial period and in the early years following the 
formation of the constitution with scarcely a thought as to the basis upon 
which the power of regulation rested, certainly without the existence of the 
power being questioned. The assizes of longbows, books and beer barrels 
-during the reigns of Henry the Seventh and Henry the Eighth, and the 
various Statutes of Laborers are not unfamiliar nor are the colonial statutes 
Tegulating interest on money, wages, bread, ferriage, mill tolls, wharfage and 
various other services and commoditie.~.· One suggestion may be gleaned from 
a study of this mass of regulation- which sheds some light upon the modem 
regulatory tendencies and. upon the nature or the peculiar relation already 
referred to. For the most part regulation, even in the Middle Ages, ex-
tended only to necessities of life and this because competition as a protection 
for the consumer was inadequate and distrusted.' The subsequent develop-: 
ment of competition as an active force resulted in the laissez-faire policy of 
-economics particularly characteristic of the first half. of our national exist-
ence• and regulatory statutes ceased because there was no need for them. 
'Logically, therefore, it would se<!m that ·should competition again become 
-inadequate the natural consequence would be the reappearance of regulatory 
statutes in order to supplement it. During the inactive interim, however, the 
absence of these statutes bec;ame so universally accepted that their reappear-
.ance raised a question as to the power of the state to enact them, a power 
which was once unquestioned. Accordingly the necessity arose of protecting 
the public where it is deemed necessary without revolutionizing the social 
order. The court proceeded to meet this necessity in Munn v. Illinois, supra, 
with the phrase ''business affected with the public interest." Businesses so 
affected are subject to the control of the state to the e:ictent that the returns 
derived from their pursuit can be limited. Businesses not so affected may be 
regulated in other ways where their conduct affects health or safety for in-
stance, but their profits may not be directly curtailed. 
The contribution of the Middle Ages then is this: That where com-
petition is inadequate to protect the consumer against extortion in securing 
the necessities of life, there is precedent for governmental intervention and 
the "peculiar relation" may be said to exist. It remains to be determined 
whether the modern instances in which regulation has been upheld have 
actually given effect to this old principle without acknowledgement. 
Although the doctrine of "business affected with the public interest" was 
launched in Munn v. Illinois and was the real basis for the decision, there 
8 3 HEN. VII, Cap. 13; 25 HEN. VIII, Cap. 15; 35 HEN. VIII, Cap. 8; M'.Ass. REY. 
LAws 1648; Fn:!JND ON POLICE POWER, p. 382. 
• ROGEllS, Six CENl'IJllIES OF WoaK AND WAGES, p. 139. 
• 28 HAav. L. REv. 84. 
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was much in the opinion in that case that gave aid and comfort to the oppo-
nents of any and all government regulation. The element of monopoly was 
stressed and a certain vague analogy to the common carrier suggested so that 
it seemed possible to confine the "anomaly'' within comparatively narrow 
limits. In Budcl v. New York," another grain eJevator case, the doctrine Wl/-S 
affirmed without extension. In Brass v. North Dakota,10 which followed, 
however,· the reactionaries who sought to check the development of the doc-
trine should have been slightly disillusioned. "This case has been frequently 
cited as modifying Munn v. Illinois to the extent of holding the monopolistu. 
feature unnecessary. The following language, quoted from the opinion, dis- • 
closes that this conclusion is slightly inaccurate although the result is per-
haps the same. "When it is once ~dmitted, as it is admitted here, that it is 
competent for the legislative power to control the business of elevating and 
storing grain, whether carried on by individuals, or associations, in cities of 
one size and in some ·circumstances, it follows that such power may be legally 
asserted over the same business when carried on in smaller cities and in other 
circumstances. It may be conceded that that would not be wise legislation 
which provided regulations in every case and overlooked differences in the 
facts that call for regulation, but as we have no right to revise the wisdom 
or expediency of the law in question, so we would not be justified in imput-
. ing an improper exercise of discretion to the legislature of North Dakota." 
The case may be cited, however, ~s- the beginning of the end for all attempts 
to limit the doctrine by artificial distinctions. 
Munn v. Illinois contains the first of a series of dissenting opinions which 
has been continued in all of its successors, each striving to repudiate or at 
least to limit the doctrine advanced, by means of distinctions which the ma-
jority of the court have consistently disregarded. It has been maintained 
that ·it is necessary that the property be devoted to a public use, that there 
be some public grant or franchise or some analogy to the innkeeper or carrier 
or some right upon the part of the public to demand service. In the opinion 
rendered in the case of German Ailiance Insurance Co. v. Lewis in which the 
business of fire insurance was held to be affected with the public interest the 
repudiatiqn of the artificial distinctions which was begun in the Brass case 
was conclusively effected. The court admits that cases can be cited which 
support the attempted distinction:; but says further: "The distinction is 
artificial. It is indeed but the assertion that the cited examples embrace all 
cases of public interest. The complainants explicitly so contend, urging that 
the test that applies excludes the idea that there can be a public interest which 
gives the power of regulation as distinct from a public use which necessarily, 
· it is contended, can only apply to property and not to personal contracts. The 
distinction, we think, has no basis in principle, (Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 
219 U. S. 104) ; nor has the other contention that the service which cannot 
be demanded cannot be regulated." 
The artificial distinction having been finally cast aside in the case last 
• 143 u. s. 517. 
10 153 u. s. 391. 
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cited the court proceeded to leave the phrase "business affected with the 
public interest'' unrestricted except for the various examples which were 
given, but made no progress toward a definition of any sort. So far as 
previous indications are to be relied upon, therefore, from the point of view 
of the Supreme Court, the principal case will merely add another to the list 
of businesses so effected and the ccurt will presumably continue on its way 
with no attempt to clarify the underlying principle upon which the doctrine 
rests, or to provide a reliable test in accordance with which the fate of future 
exercises of the regulatory power may be determined in advance. The dis-
trict court, however, in the principal case attacked the question with more 
temerity and suggested what seems to be a reliable test, besides illuminating 
considerably the basis upon which regulatory power rests. 
The court recognizes the old artificial distinctions to a certain extent by 
dividing all examples of regulation into two classes, one of which includes 
all public utilities and all cases in which there is a public franchise involved 
or a public service performed; the other, a number of apparently unrelated 
cases in which none of these elements appear. It is obvious that the real 
difficulty in defining the phrase "business affected with the public interest" is 
encountered in attempting to find a common basjs upon which cases of the 
latter class may be said to re~t since the public nature of the first class has 
long been conceded to be a sufficient basis for regulation. The court finds 
the basis for the regulation of the second class in the "power of the people 
to restrict the theretofore existing circle in which. a person had his life and 
the one within which he had.his prcperty, to bring these down narrower on 
account of the conditions that were found to be oppressive to the people." 
In other words, underlying all these cases there is a common characteristic, 
namely, that by virtue of economic conditions or whatnot certain businesses 
have been placed in an advantageous position enabling those engaged in their 
pursuit to oppress the public, and the latter is not without remedy. In the 
latter class the court placed married women surety laws, usury statutes 
despite the historical explanation, and the coal industry under its present 
circumstances. Having set UP. the two classes the court says that when the 
same evil is found to exist in both classes. inasmuch as the regulation in both 
cases is based upon the same po!ice power, the Same remedy should be 
applied and that since regulation of prices has long been the known remedy 
for preventing extortion in the first class it should be applied to the same 
evil when it is found to exist in the second class. 
The possibility of reconciling all cases of regulation upon the basis of 
the relation of the industries involved to the possibility of oppression was 
suggested by Freundu. several years ago and seems to achieve all that the 
district court achieved by dividing the instances of regulation into two classes. 
It is true that the 11ublic utilities, for instance, are affected with the public 
interest because they have received public franchises. They are also affected 
with the public interest in the same manner that the coal industry is so 
affected in that they ordinarily occupy a position of economic advantage 
11 FREUND, POLICE POWER, p. 388. 
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which they can use to oppress the public. Possessing the same advantage 
without the public franchises, if that were possible, the utilities would still 
he affected with the public interest in the same manner as the second class 
of cases set up by the court. As Freund" suggests upon the theory of the 
necessity of businesses bearing a relation to the possibility of oppression in 
order that they may be regulated it is possible on the one hand to account 
for existing legislation without conceding legislative power with regard to 
any and all commodities which may be selected, and on the other hand to 
allow for new applications of this power. If this relation to the possibility 
of oppression is an acceptable test, there remains a single awkward question 
as to the court's right of review where the legislature has in effect declared 
the oppression to exist. 
The effectiveness of the test suggested by Freund and the District Court 
<>f Indiana can best be determined by its application to new instances of the 
exercise of the police power which have not been passed upon by the Supreme 
Court. Such an instance is the recent Montana law undertaking to regulate 
prices of commodities of all descriptions "from· coal to diamonds, from the 
babe's first swaddling clothes to the corpse's shroud." The law was passed 
upon by the District Court of Montana in Holter Hardware Co. v. Boyl~ 
and was held to be unconstitutional upon the ground that many purely private 
businesses were included within its scope, the court admitting, however, .that 
''businesses affected with a public interest" were a proper subject of regula-
tion. The court made no attempt to. draw a line between the two sorts of 
businesses, but said in effect merely that the legislature bad gone too far. 
It 1s obvious that two factors are essential in order to enable those engaged 
1n any particular business to oppress the public. In the first place, the in:.. 
dustry must involve a necessity of life or at least a product of great im-
p.ortance to the welfare of the community, and in the second place competition 
in the industry must be inadequate to protect the consumer. Otherwise regu-
lation is useless and undesirable. It will be noted that these same charac-
teristics were the basis of most of the regulation of the Middle Ages.· It is 
.also clear that no declaration of the legislature can force these characteristics 
upon any business in which they are wholly lacking. The attitude of the 
courts toward the finding of facts by the legislature as indicated in the pass-
age of a regulatory act bas been said to be that of an appellate· court toward 
a finding by the jury. If there are any facts at all tci support the decision it 
will not be disturbed. In the tight of the test suggested therefore, the dis-
tinction between the Indiana and Montana laws is clear and the decision in 
each case may be supported. It is a matter of common knowledge that both 
<>f the characteristics necessary to afford the opportunity for oppression are 
present in the coal industry today. It is a prime necessity of life and at 
11resent tl;iere is a shortage of supply. Therefore the "peculiar relation" exists. 
The business is "affected with the public interest." On the other hand, the 
:Scope of the Montana law obviously includes a number of commodities which 
u FREUND, POLICE Pown, p. 388. 
u a63 Fed. I34- · 
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-can in no way conceivable under present economic conditions become instru-
ments for oppression,-weapons with which their wielders can "bludgeon the 
public." As the Supreme Court has repeatedly said, however, businesses 
which are today purely private may tomorrow, through a now inconceivable 
change of conditions, enter the "public interest'' class. 
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has steadily extended the scope of the 
phrase "business affected with the public interest'' without committing itself 
to any definition or test it is perhaps unlikely that it will now alter this policy. 
Nevertheless, the test suggested by Freund and by the district court in the 
Indiana case seems logical, fits all ~pplications of the power which have been 
sanctioned by the Supreme Court and seems both enlightening and reassuring 
as to the extent to which the doctrine will be carried. A. W. B. 
APPEAI.S BY THE STATE IN CRI'MINAI. CAsr:s.-Many state constitutions 
provide that no one shall be placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Hence, after an acquittal by a jury the State cannot prosecute an appeal for 
1qe purpose of securing a reversal. But an appeal ordinarily serves two very 
distinct purposes. It not only questions the correctness of the judgment below 
as a basis for affirming or reversing it, but it operates as a means for en-
abling the higher court to lay down rules of decision to be followed in sub-
sequent cases. This is the characteristic common law. method for the develop-
ment of the law, and unless cases can be appealed the law can never be 
authoritatively expounded. To secure this exceedingly important result in 
-criminal cases many States have by statute provided for appeals by the State 
for the sole purpose of determining questions of law. 
It is _quite obvious that when such an appeal is taken on a question of law 
after a verdict of not guilty, the decision of the appellate court can have no 
direct effect in that case. The dcuble function normally performed by an 
appeal changes to the single function of declaring the law without affecting 
1he question of present liability. 
Now this opens an excellent opportunity for a technical attack on the 
validity of the whole proceeding. Every new step in legal administration has 
to run the gauntlet of that considerable number of judges who are instinctive-
1y inclined to consider novelty and unconstitqtionality as synonymous terms. 
The statute under discussion calls for a decision in a case no longer pending 
in the full and ordinary sense. The controversy between the parties, so far as 
it is to be determined and fixed by the judgment, is entirely over. The 
presence or absence of error is an academic question in that particular case. 
Why, then, should a court bother itself further? Why not stop the whole 
proceeding and refuse to take any chance of committing the judicial impro-
priety of passing on a "moot'' case? 
In State v. Allen (Kan., 1920) 191 Pac. 476, this question is quite vig-
orously argued on both sides. But the reactionary element was in the. 
minority, and the State of Kansas has placed itself in the list of States which 
recognize that courts can serve the people in new ways and still survive. The 
minority opinion is an excellent example of that extreme judicial conserva-
tism so familiar to the student of legal history, though curiously enough it 
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fails to cite the one conspicuous authority which squarely supports its con-
clusion. That authority is United States v. Evans (1907) 30 App. D. C. 58, 
affirmed on certiorari in 213 U. S. 297 (1909). In that case the United States 
Supreme Court held that deciding an appeal for the purpose of establishing a 
rule of law to be observed in subsequent cases was not an exercise of judicial 
power. The decision is illustrative of the curious tendency of the United 
States_ Supreme Court to be ver;: conservative and technical in regard to 
formal and procedural matters while showing the most enlightened liberality 
in determining many questions involving substantial rights. It is in line with 
the astonishing decision in Slocum v. New York l,ife Ins. Co. (1913) 228 U.S. 
364 which held invalid a statute providing for the entry of a judgment not-
withstanding a verdict where the court erroneously failed to direct a con-
trary verdict on motion made at the trial, and with such cases as Insurance 
Co. v. Hallock (186g) 6 Wall. 556, holding a writ without a seal absolutely 
void- on collateral attack. 
Doubtless judicial power was not exercised in exactly this way at the 
common law. But it is clear that one of the important duties of appellate 
courts has always been tlie exposition of the law through decisions upon 
points arising in the course of litigated controversies, and if the State is so 
desirous of securing the exercise of this function that it is willing to enjoy 
it even though it has to dispense with the normally concurrent function of 
affirming .or reversing the judgment, why should the courts refuse to do that 
m1;1ch merely because they find themselves unable to do more? These statutes 
authorizing the determination of points of law are rather common and have 
been accepted practically without question for many years by a substantial 
number of our state courts. In Ohio such an act has been in force since 
186g (L. 186g, p. 310); in Indiana since 1852 (R S. 1852, 381); in Iowa at 
least since 186o (R S. 186o, Sec. 4926). In these States and in many others 
the practice is well settled and commonly used. See State v. Laughlin (1go8) 
171 Ind. 66; State v. Arnold (1895) 144 Ind. 651; State v. Willingham (1905) 
86 Miss. 203; State v. Gilbert (1908) 138 Iowa 335; State v. Ward (1888) 75 
Iowa 637; State v. Frisbee (1912) 8 Okla. Cr. 400; Commonwealth v. Bruce 
.(1881) 79 Ky. 56o; State v. Du Laney (1go8) 87 Ark. 17; State v. Speer 
(1916) 123 Ark. 44g. State v. Miller (1913) 14 Ariz. 440, seems to be the 
only instance of a State court refusing to sustain the validity of such a 
statute, due, apparently, to its being somewhat overawed by the action of the 
United States Supreme Court in the Evans Case. . 
The practice has obvious advantages. Vital questions of law may other-
wise be wrongly decided with no adequate means for setting them right. As 
the majority in State v. Allen (supra) observe, the practice authorized by the 
statute was criticised "not on.account of any practical evil consequences which 
might be appx:ehended, but by reason of a somewhat extreme application 01 
an abstract theory." That criticism of this technical kind did not appeal to 
the court is an encouraging indication that, in spite of occasional relapses, 
American appellate courts are generally alive to their duties and responsi-
bilities in making the judicial department of the government responsive to 
the demands of a developing social order. E. R S. 
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Wxu.s.-RsvocA'l'IoN BY O'l'Hr:R WRI'l'ING.-The right to dispose of prop-
erty by will is a creation of the positive law. In re Tyner's Estate, 97 Minn. 
181. It is not a natural right and hence is effective only when exercised in 
strict accord with the provisions of the law. Crain v. Crain, 17 Tex. &>. So 
accustomed are we to disposal of property by will that we may not be sur-
prised to find some courts even regarding this right as one of the "inherent 
incidents of human existence," as a "right absolute," which legislatures can-
not "unreasonably regulate to destroy," nor "courts deal with in any spirit of 
mere discretion." Ball v. Boston, 153 Wis. 21. Whether or no, as recent 
writers have concluded, wills as we employ them were first developed in 
Rome, certain it is that the right to dispose of property by will has been of 
very gradual development at the common law, and has been and is almost 
wholty regulated by statute. Until STAT, 32 fuNRY VIII, c. l, there could be 
· no real will of realty, though by means of uses equity had opened a way to 
accomplish much the same result. This first great statute of witts merely 
gave the power, but did not prescribe the form of the writing. It was not 
until the Statute of Frauds in l66o that any special form of execution was re-
quired, and then only in the case of the disposition of real property. In this 
statute, too, we find for the first time fixed requirements for the revocation 
of a wi11, viz., by some other wilt, or by some other writing, or by designated 
acts upon the will the testator desires to revoke. As to these requirements, 
and their curious extension by the courts, even contrary to the statute, see 
17 MICH. L. ~- 331. The third great wills act in England, t VICT. c. 26, 
1837, made no changes in the provisions for executing or revoking wills that 
need be specialty noted ti11 later. Both statutes make specific requirements; 
under each no will or revocation can be effective which does not comply with 
the statute. A man may always change his mind, but he cannot make that 
change effective upon the legal disposition he has made of his property at 
death· except he fottow some one or more of the ways prescribed in the 
statute. As I V1CT. c. 26 dates from 1837, it is not strange that the statutes 
of the states in the United States are quite as likely to follow the earlier 
statute of 166o as this one of 1837. 
The New York Statute as to revocation of witts fo11ows the English 
Statute of l66o as to the designated acts of change or destruction· to the wilt, 
but it foltows the Statute of l V1CT. in requiring the "other writing" declar-
ing such revocation to be executed with the same formalities with which a 
witt must be executed. The Statute of Frauds made no requirements as 
to how the "other writing declaring the same" should be executed. Under 
each statute the sufficiency of a ~riting expressing an intent to revoke a wilt 
bas often come before the court. 
In the recent New York case of In re McGilfs Will (Court of Appeals, 
July 7, 1!)20), 128 N. E. 194, the court of last resort affirmed the intermediate 
courts (see 177 N. Y. Suppl: 86, 181 N. Y. Suppl. 48) admitting to probate 
a will which the testatrix evidently desired to revoke. Indeed she died happy 
because she thought she had done so. "But to revoke or cancel a written 
wilt, compliance must be had with the statute." The court found that the 
following note did not comply. "Dr. O'Kennedy-Dear Friend: Please 
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destroy the will I made in favor of Thomas Hart." The note was signed by 
the testatrix, and on the back were the signatures of two witnesses. They 
testified that they signed at the request of testatrix, signing on the back 
beeause there was not room on the front. The note was handed to Dr. 
O'Kennedy when he was in hospital, and he was not discharged from the 
·hospital and did not go to his safe where the will was until after the death 
of the testatrix, and then he did not destroy it. 
Revocation is not purely a question of intent. There must also be an 
effective act. Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475. This note showed a clear intent 
to revoke the wi11. Was it a sufficient "other paper" to comply with the 
statute? The court held not. It merely showed an intent that Dr. O'K"ennedy 
should destroy the will, and no doubt such a destruction following such an 
intent of the testatrix would have been a revocation within the statute. There 
are few American cases that may be regarded as on a11 fours with the prin-
cipal ·case. Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Tex. 296, is clear to the point that a letter 
by the decedent to his attorney directing him to destroy the will does not 
ipso facto work a revocation of it. It does not show an intent by this letter 
to effect an immediate revocation of the will, but instead an intent that it be 
revoked by destruction by the attorney under direction of the testator. This 
doctrine the New York case approves. 
The New York Statute requires "some other writing of the testator 
declaring such revocation." The ·English Statute of Frauds reads "other 
wr~ting declaring the same," and STATUTE I V1r:r. "some writing declaring 
an intention to l'evoke the same." It is not probable there was any legisla-
tive intent that these words should announce a different rule as to the intent 
that must appear in the writing. New York adheres to the letter of the 
sfltute and distinguishes between "declaring such revocation" of the New 
York Statute, and "declaring the same," and "declaring an intention to revoke 
the same" of the English statutes. Under the English Statute of Frauds 
it was held that a letter directing the destruction of the will amounted to "a 
present intention absolutely to revoke," "an absolute direction to revoke re-
duced into writing in the deceased's lifetime." "She died in the intention to 
revoke the will, and in the belief that it was revoked." Walcott v. Ochterlony, 
I Curt. 58o (1837). The English courts agree with the New York court that 
the words of the statute are imperative. In the Goods of Turner, L. R. 2 
P. and D. 403, per Lord Penzance, with which compare In re Evans' Will, 
g8 N. Y. S. IQ42. The statute specifies the acts which may work a revoca-
tion. There is no other way. If the statute requires a revocation an intent 
to revoke and a belief that the will is inoperative will not suffice. Runkle v. 
Gates, II Ind. 95. The courts cannot substitute for the plain requirement of 
the statute the desire or intention of the testator, even though he may suppose 
his desire accomplished, Tice v. Shipton., II3 Ky. i02, a case in which the 
testator supposed his will destroyed, but by fraud of a beneficiary the de-
etruction was prevented •. This is true even iii cases where the beneficiary tells 
the testator the destruction is complete and he believes it. In re Silva's Estate, 
I(jg Cat u6. But in Bailey v. Bailey, 5 Cush. 245, Shaw, C. J., held that an-
other paper expressing a wish that the will be destroyed, and executed as 
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wilts are required to be executed, though it made no devise or bequest, was 
nevertheless testamentary in character, might be admitted to probate, and 
sc did work a revocation of the witt. The only difference between this case 
and In re McGill's Will, if difference there be, is found in the addition in the 
Massachusetts case of the words, "it is my wish that my estate be settled 
according to law." The language of Margaret McGill's note at least sug-
gests the possibility that she intended a revocation only so far as her will was 
"made in favor of Thomas Hart." There were other provisions in her witt, 
and why is the note then not testamentary? Compare In the Go<Jds of 
Durance, L. R. :z, P. and D. 406; In the Goods of Hay, L. R. I P •. and D. 53, 
and In the Goods of Hirks, I ib. 683. On the whole subject see the annota-
tion in 3 A. L. R. 836, to the case of Dowli'ng v. Gilliland, :z86 nt. 530. No 
doubt the courts do well to insist rigidly upon written witts and revocations. 
Paro! evidence in the case of witts is dangerous, for the opportunity and 
temptation to perjury and fraud are great. As said by Ld. Ch. Talbot in 
Brown v. Selwin, Cas. temp. Talbot 240, and by many another judge in deal-
ing with witts, ''It is better to suffer a particular mischief than a general in-
convenience." But one may welt question whether the narrow interpretation 
of instruments executed with alt the formalities required by the statute does 
not needlessly inflict a particular mischief where there could be no general 
inconvenience and make a statute intended to prevent fraud into an instru-
ment of fraud. It would be no great strain to construe the note of Margaret 
McGiU, executed as the law requires for a wiU, as indicating an intention to. 
revoke the will at once without waiting for the destruction of the will by Dr. 
O'Kennedy. How can parol evidence that she so intended it, and was happy 
in the thougnt that she had accomplished her purpose, in any way defeat 
*he purpose of the statutory requirement as to revocation of wills? 
E.C.G. 
Nr:nuLOus INJUNCTIONS.-Injunctive relief is sought against alleged 
wrongdoing which is merely incidental to the conduct of a legitimate busi-
ness. The wrong is established and the court is satisfied that an injunction 
should issue. Yet some nice questions remain as to the scope and terms of 
the decree. 
The restraint should not go farther than is necessary to protect the com-
plainant's rights. The business should not be needlessly destroyed or em-
barassed. If the defendant has asserted that it is impossible to conduct the 
business without the incidents complained of, (as he is likely to do in 
nuisance cases, with a view to securing a holding that there is no nuisance 
or that, though there be a legal nuisance, the balance of convenience forbids 
an injunction) strict logic might require that this be taken as a conclusive 
admission 'when it comes to settling the terms of the decree. In view, how-
ever, of the fact that "impossibility'' is, in these cases, relative, and in view 
of the public interest involved, it is good sense, if not good logic, to give 
the defendant an opportunity to do what he has asserted is impossible, if 
there appears to be the slightest chance of success, and such seems to be the 
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practice. Chamberlain v. Douglas, 24 N. Y. App. Div. 582; Anderson v. 
American Smelting Co., 265 Fed. 928. 
At the same time, it will not do merely to enjoin the defendant from 
conducting his business as he has in the past, for he could fulfill this decree 
by varying some detail which would not at all remove the objectionable fea-
tures. The court must, if posSI'ble, reach all wrongful practices of the sort 
complained of, must throw the defendant back within the lines of his legal 
privileges. 
· In cases where the circumstances are such that the rights of the parties 
can be defined in exact terms, this principle is easy to apply. Thus where 
defendant, who had no right to flow plaintiff's land, erected a dam which 
flowed the land to a depth of IS inches, the decree ordered defendant to 
lower the dam fifteen inches. Rothery v. N. Y. Rubber Co-., 90 N. Y. 30. 
But in cases of nuisance and of unfair competition, it constantly happens 
that, although the court is convinced that defendant has gone beyond his 
privileges and has invaded the complainant's rights, it is impossible to define 
these rights and privileges in terms that are at all definite. In this situation, 
it has been a common practice to pass the difficulty to the defendant by a 
decree which is little more than an order to cease committing nuisances, or 
to cease unfair competition. In Winchell v. Waukeshaw, no Wis. IOI, the 
decree restrained discharge of se:wage into a river "unless same shall have 
first been so deodorized and purified as not to contain foul, offensive or 
noxious matter capable of injuring plaintiff or her property or causing a 
nuisance thereto." In Northwood v. Barber Asphalt Co., I26 Mich. 284, 
the defendant was punished for violation-of a decree enjoining the emission 
of fumes "in such quantities as to materially injure the health of plaintiffs or 
in any way interfere with the comfortable. enjoyment of their homes." In 
Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, the decree of the lower court re-
strained the operation of power hammers, etc., "so is to render the premises 
of the plaintiff unfit for use and enjoyment as a residence by a reasonable 
and normal person." The fault in these decrees is obvious. , As was said in 
the last case, in modifying the decree, "The entry of an.injunction is in some 
respects analogous to the publication of a penal statute; it is notice that 
certain things must be done or not done, under a penalty to be fixed by the 
court Such a decree should be as definite, clear and precise in its terms as 
possible, so that there may be no reason or excuse for misunderstanding or 
disobeying it; atid when practicable it should plainly indicate to the defendant 
all of the acts which he is restrained from doing, without calling upon him 
for inferences or conclusions about which persons may well differ." See 
also, Ballantine v. Webb, 84 Mich. 38. 
In Laurie v. Laurie, 9 Paige 234, the Chancellor denied a motion for 
attachment for violation of a somewhat similar injunction, saying, "As de-
fendant is bound to obey the process of the court at his peril, the language of 
the injunction should be so clear and explicit that an unlearned man can 
understand its meaning without the necessity of employing counsel to advise 
him." This is perhaps an unattainable standard, but a wholesome one to 
aim at. Of course it is not likely that any court would impose any serious 
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punishment upon a party who atte~pted in good faith to observe a decree, 
although it found that he had done so. Good faith is welt recognized as a 
circumstance mitigating contempt. 22 Cvc. 1026. See Northwest v. Barber 
Asphalt Co,. supra. But no one would contend that this cures the ill. To 
enter an obscure decree and invite the defendant to throw himself upon the 
clemency of the court, is neither fair to the defendant nor to the complainant, 
nor is it a dignified way to administer justice. We do, however, in the unfair 
trade cases, find some courts taking the extraordinary position that uncer-
tainty in the decree is of positive merit. In Charles E. Hires Co. v. Cor,-
.mmers Co., loo Fed. 8og, 813, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 
said, "(The court) is not called upon to decide whether a new label proposed 
for adoption would infringe." 
"This is especially so here, where the infringement was deliberate and 
designed. In such case the court ought not to say how near the infringer 
may lawfully approximate the label of the complainant, but should place the 
burden upon the guilty party of deciding for himself how near he may with 
safety drive to the edge of the precipice, and whether it be not better for him 
to keep as far from it as possible." A decree was ordered enjoining defend-
ant from using labels or bottles "calculated to deceive purchasers," etc. It 
has been sought to support this view with the familiar maxim that equity 
will not aid a wrongdoer (Oneida Community v. Oneida Trap Co., 168 N. Y. 
App. Div. 769), but this is inappropriate as applied to a defendant who is not 
seeking affirmative relief but merely asking that the decree against him be 
made certain. If this position has any justification, it lies in the circumstance 
that in cases of this type the· defendant has no "equity" to hew close to the 
line, and if he does not insist upon hewing close will have no difficulty in 
avoiding a contempt. Even in this type of cases, the practice is not uniform. 
Coca Cola v. Gay Ola Co., 2II Fed. 942. And see Nms, UNFAIR Co"MPSTITION, 
§ 367, ff. It would seem that, although the defendant may have no equity to 
ask the court to aid to "drive to the edge of the precipice," it is sound and 
convenient practice to give the defendant an opportunity to submit a pro-
posed remedy which, if it is approved by complainant or is clearly within the 
.defendant's rights, should be approved (that is to say, excepted from the gen-
eral terms of the decree). When we turn from 'this type of case to cases of 
nuisance, incident to the prosecution of a legitimate business and difficult to 
eliminate without heavy expense and even jeopardy to the business, probably 
no one would question that the defendant has an "equity'' to hew to the line, 
and is well entitled if not to a decree clearly marking out that line, at least 
to one which will not drive him "as far from it as possible." 
How can the court best meet these demands? That depends very much 
upon the circumstances of each case, and no general rule seems possible. It 
may, however, be worth while to note some of the expedients which have 
been used. In the unfair ·trade cases, the courts have frequently given the 
defendant an opportunity to submit for its approval a scheme of reform, a 
new label, a new package, a new name, a new method. NIMS, UNFAIR CoM-
PSTITION, S 367. If the defendant "drives to the edge of the precipice," the 
-court may welt say that it is not prepared, at that stage of the case, to decide 
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the point, and that the defendant, if he wishes the stamp of approval, must 
withdraw to clearer ground. Cases where the defendant has an equity to 
hew to the line are not so easy to deal with. Iri some cases the best expedient 
will be what we might call an experimental decree. In Collins v. W ay11e Iron 
Works, supra, the court modified the decree so that it enjoined operations be-
tween certain hours of the night, or at any other time save behind closed 
doors and windows, saying "At least such a measure of relief should be tried 
first." In Babcock v. New Jersey Stockyard Co., 20 N. J. Eq. 296, there is a 
very interesting decree with three branches, one of which was a prohibition 
of the keeping of live hogs on the premises for mor.e than three hours, re-
serving to the plaintiff the right to apply for a modification of the time, 
"which is adopted merely on conjecture." In other cases, although a nuisance 
is proved, it may be best to postpone relief till further information is gained 
in regard to means of improvement. This was done in another branch 
of the decree last mentioned, the point being referred to a commissioner, 
with leave to either party to move for action upon his report. In other 
cases it may be best to postpone relief while the defendant experiments 
with remedial measures. This was done in Shelfer v: London Electric Co., 
[18g5] 2 Ch. 388, and in Anderson v. American Smelting Co., supra. Of 
course, if the balance of convenience runs the other way, it might be more 
equitable to render immediately .a decree which would be certain to give 
relief, with leave to the defeftdant to apply for a modification upon a showing 
that there is another adequate and less onerous remedy. This was done in 
Chamberlain v. Douglas, supra, and in Galbraith v. Oliver, 3 Pittsburgh 78. 
These and probably other expedients are available. Equity boasts of the 
flexibility of its remedies. And if this phase of injunctive relief is given 
proper attention it would seem that we ~$ht wholly eliminate those decrees 
which give the defendant "no rule of conduct which the law had not before 
prescnoed" (Ballantine v. Webb, supra), yet rumble the thunder of attach-
ment. · E. N •. n. 
Ditcr.ARA'tORY JUDGMtNTs.-That statutes designed to further the cause of 
social justice should have to stand the test of constitutionality is inevitable 
under our system. It is, however, unfortunate that judges generally speaking 
are strongly disposed to "view with alarm" any such statutes that depart in 
any marked degree from the beaten path. Unquestionably there is something 
about legal training and experience in law, particularly upon the bench, that 
tends to extreme conservatism. That our judges should be reasonably con-
servative in order that our fundamental liberties may be preserved and the 
law kept steady, though progressive, through passing waves of popular desire 
and prejudice no sensible man can deny. But there is a big difference be-
tween such healthy conservatism and distrust of new things simply because 
they are new. "I have known judges,'' said Chi~f Justice Erle, "bred in the 
world of legal studies, who delighted- in nothing so much as in a strong 
decision. Now a strong decision is a decision opposed to common-sense and 
to common convenience." Sr:moR, CoNVr:RSATIONS · WITH DISTINGUISlll:D 
Pr:RsoNS [Ed. of i88o] 314 Such a decision was that of the New York.court 
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in !'lies v. So. Buffalo Ry. Co., 200 N. Y. z;1. It took, however, such a case 
to arouse the people and the bar and the judges, and since that decision legis-
lation similar to that then declal'ed unconstitutional has been almost uniformly 
upheld. Thus the law does ultimately grow. 
The Declaratory Judgments Act of Michigan (Act No. 150, P. A. 1919) 
provided as follows: (Sec. 1) "No action or proceeding in any court of 
record shall be open to abjection on the ground that a merely declaratory 
judgment, decree or order is sought thereby, and the court may make bind-
ing declarations of rights whether any consequential relief is or could be 
claimed, or not, including the determination, at the instance of anyone claim-
ing to be interested under a deed, will or other written instrument, of any 
question of construction arising under the instrument and a declaration of the 
rights of the parties interested." (Sec. 3) "When further relief based upon 
a declaration of rights shall become necessary or proper after such declara-
tion has been made, application may be made by petition to any court having 
jurisdiction to grant such relief, for an order directed to any party or parties 
whose rights have been determined by such declaration, to show cause why 
such further relief should not be granted forthwith, upon such reasonable 
notice as shall be prescribed by the court in the said order." In the case of 
Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway Co., decided Sept. 30, 1920, the Supreme 
Court of Michigan (Sharp and Clark, JJ., dissenting) held this act uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it called upon the courts to exercise powers and 
perform duties not judicial 
The act under consideration was virtually a combination of Order No. 
25, Rule 5, of the English Court Rules adopted in 1883, and Order No. s.ta, 
Rule l, of such rules adopted in 1893, under which the English courts ~ave 
entered many declaratory judgments. Mr. Justice Fellows, speaking for the 
majority of the court in the instant case curiously brushes aside all con-
sideration of the English cases and practice as having no bearing because 
"* * * as England has no written Constitution and the English courts but 
follow the mandates of Parliament the decisions of the English Courts are of 
no avail upon th~ question now under consideration." The fact ·is that the 
English practice is based not upon a mandate of Parliament but upon court 
rule. See Joyce, J., in Norlhwestern Marine Eng. Co. v. Leeds Forge Co., 
[1go6] 1 Ch. 324 328. In other words. the En~lish courts themselves concluded 
to undertake this "service to the people,'' as they have frequently expressed it. 
We .are then driven to the conclusion either that the English courts do not 
know what is properly included under judicial power or they boldly cut loose 
from the beaten path oi judicial action. It is of course incredible that 
English judges do not appreciate the nature and scope of judicial power, in 
truth the notion of judicial power and its field were :familiar to English 
lawyers and courts long before this country had an independent political 
existence. When the framers of the Constitution made provision for "the 
judicial power" they did not coin a new term or express a novel idea. See l 
Br.ACK, Co:i.nr. p. 26g. The court points out that there are similar statutes in 
Wisconsin (Chap. 242, Laws of 1919) and in Florida (No. 75, Laws of 
Florida, 1919). No reference is made to the recent New York act (see 
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W1cnRSHAM, 29 YAI.Jt L. Joui go8), and the New Jersey Act of 1915 (New 
Jersey Laws, 1915, p. 184), appJ.ied in a striking manner in Mayor v. East 
Jersey Water Co., 109 Atl. 121 {1919), is referred to only in connection with 
construction of wills, a matter regarding which that statute does not deal, and 
is dismissed with the observation that "this court has for many years con-
strued wills . in equity cases * * * without question." Without giving it as 
a reason for its decision the court throughout its opinion lays great emphasis 
upon the danger and impropriety of making tlie courts the "authorized legal 
advisers of the people." Mr. Justice Fellows says: "Before this court, with 
its membership of eight, takes up the work of advising three million people 
and before the legislature is called upon to increase the membership of this 
court so as to efficiently conduct this work, it is well that this court pause 
long enough to consider and consider fully, whether the act calls upon us to 
perform any duties prescribed by the Constitution or to exercise any power 
therein conferred." It is not uninteresting to observe that the English courts 
have not been overwhelmed with the task of advising in the way of declaratory 
judgments upwards of forty million people, and the Michigan Act had the 
same scope as the English Rules. On the contrary, in Dyson v. Attorney 
General [1910] l K. B. 410, where the defendant vigorously asserted the im-
propriety of making declarations of rights in cases of the type there under 
consideration on the score that there would be "innumerable other actions for 
declarations" the court refused to ·recognize such objections as valid, Farwell, 
L. J., saying, "* *"* but if inconvenience is a legitimate consideration at all, 
the convenience in the public interest is all in favor of providing a speedy and 
easy access to the Courts for any of His Majesty's subjects," etc. 
The court refers to and quotes from many cases to show that it is estab-
lished by overwhelming authority that courts are not exercising judicial 
functions in rendering advisory opinions to the executive or legislative branch, 
and also that for the same reason cases involving merely "moot" or hypo-
theticai questions will be dismissed. The soundness of these positiO!lS may 
very well be conceded. The inquiry remains, does the Act under examina-
tion provide for proceedings leading to a judgment which is merely advisory? 
and does it call upon the court to express opinions upon purely hypothetical 
situations? 
· Bottom is struck cnly when one comes to the inquiry as to what is judiciat 
power. There are many cases which have discussed the subject and many 
definitions have been essayed by courts and writers. Some of these defini-
tions standing alone clearly would exclude cases looking to mere declarations 
of rights, sometimes other definitions found even in the same opinion would 
as clearly include such proceedings. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 
upon which the court in the principal case relied very strongly, is a splendid 
example of this. Out of the mass of cases can there be found some dividing 
line, some test by which a new situation may be determined? It does not help 
any to say that if the conclusion is final judicial power has been exercised, 
for that begs the whole question. 
Surely it must be clear that the essence of judicial power is the power 
to make decisions. But that does not take us far enough. What kinds of 
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decisions? or decisions in what situations? Since law operates only in re-
spect of actual facts, it would seem fair to say that judicial decisions must be 
in respect to controversies in actual as distinguished from hypothetical situa-
tions. Obviously these controversies must be with reference to rights, duties, 
or status in the legal sense, in other words, they must be justiciable. The 
advisory opinion cases, then, clearly fall on the side of non-judicial functions 
for they do not decide anything as to anybody's rights or duties in respect 
of actual facts. They are not decisions but .opinions. "Courts do not speak 
through their opinions but through their judgments and decrees." Heck v. 
Bailey, 204 Mich. 54- The Muskrat case would seem clearly to fall into this 
class, for the case is essentially the same whether Congress asks the court 
to advise it as to whether an act is constitutional or not or Congress purports 
to authorize Mr. Muskrat to ask the court to rule on such question. The 
"moot" cases are equally clear. They are "moot'' because there cannot be a 
decision in a controversy based on actual facts. Hence no judicial power can 
be exercised. The English Courts recognize this, and in Glasgow Navigation 
Co. v. Iron Ore Co. [1910] A. C. 243, the construction of a charter party was 
refused because as said by Lord Chancellor Lorebum, "It was not the func-
tion of a Court of Law to advise parties as to what would be their rights 
under a hypothetical state of facts." The case of Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit 
Judge, 56 Mich. 236, which Mr. Justice Fellows says cannot be distinguished 
from the one before the court, falls within this class, for the proceeding there 
provided for by the statute was the establishment of wills of living persons. 
It is of the essence of a will .that it speaks from death, during the testator's 
lifetime it is nothing more than a paper with characters thereon as a deed or 
negotiable instrument before delivery. A request of a court to construe a 
contract if it sl1ould be made or to declare what would be the parties' rights 
thereunder would present a situation such as was passed on in the Lloyd case. 
It is interesting and important to .refer now to varying types of cases in 
which courts have proceeded to exercise their functions. The most common 
cases of course are those in which someone's rights have been invaded (what-
ever it is that amounts to that) and a wrong (in the sense in which the word 
is used in courts) has been committed. To this must be added the not un-
usual though less frequent cases wherein there has been a threatened invasion 
of someone's rights. The court in the principal case apparently would say 
that only in these types of cases is judicial power exercised. 
It remains to be shown that courts do in a variety of situations proceed 
to judgment or decree where there has been no invasion or threatened in-
vasion of rights, where they have proceeded and do proceed to final order 
without anything more in essence being accomplished than a declaration of 
the rights of the parties. 
{a) There are multitudes of cases in which courts have entertained 
suits to quiet title or to remove clouds. Defects in chains of title give rise to 
such actions very frequently, and decrees are entered despite the fact fliat no 
one is really disputing the ownership of the complainant. They are thus in 
essence in a great many cases nothing but declarations of rights-ownership. 
It is not necessary to start a court in the exercise of its judicial power that 
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there be a controversy .in the popular sense. Very many cases that proceed 
to final judgment with conceded propriety are amicable. The ordinary partl· 
tion case is more often consented to than contested. 
(b) Courts are every day entertaining bills for construction of wills, of 
trust instruments, and for direction of trustees. What are these but declara· 
tions? That the proceedings mentioned above are in equity is not any ex-
planation; for courts of equity but exercise a part of the judicial power. The 
statement by Mr. Justice Fellows passing off the admitted exercise by chancery 
courts of the exercise of jurisdiction to construe wills that "such jurisdiction 
has been exercised without question" hardly appeals to one's intelligence as 
a differentiation. 
(c) Closely allied to the suits to.quiet title are the proceedings under 
the Torrens Acts to register title. There hardly can be found clearer in-
stances of mere declarations of rights than in a large percentage of such 
cases. See Robinson v. Kerrigan, ISI Cal. 40. Destroyed Record Acts such 
as was upheld in Title and Docmne11t Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan .• 150 Cal. 
289; are instances of a rather special application of the principle of the Tor-
rens Acts. 
(d) The not uncommon statutes which provide for the determination of 
heirs without an order of distribution are another instance of a provision 
fooking forward to a mere declalCltion of rights. While there is some dif· 
ference in the language of the statutes as to whether such declarations are 
final (See 18 C. J. 876), no question has ever been raised as to the constitu· 
tionality of the statutes pro.viding for such proceedings or as to the proceed-
ings involving an exercise of judicial power. There is a Michigan statute 
(CoYP. L., §§ 13937-41) of this sort under which Michigan courts for years 
have proceeded. 
(e) That a state may constitutionally provide by statute for court pro-
ceedings to determine the validity of bonds proposed to be issued by irriga-
tion districts was decided in Crall v. Posa Irrigation District, 87 Cal. 140, 
and in Nampa, etc., Irrigation Di.strict v. Brose, II Idaho 474- See further 
Kmm:Y ON IRRIGATION AND WATF.R R:rGR'l'S, § 1420. In Tregea v. Modesto 
Irr. Dist., 164 ·u. S. 179, there is a dictum expressing doubt as to whether 
such proceedings involve an exercise of judicial power, but nothing wall 
decided on that. point, and in People v. Linda Vista ·Irr. Di.st., 128 Cal. 47', 
the court adhered to its earlier holding in the face of such dictum. The 
principal case is the first one to rely in the least upon that dictum. 
(f) The Wisconsin statute (§ 2352) providing for an action to affirm 
a marriage and that "the judgment in such action shall declare such marriage 
valid or annul the same, and be conclusive upon all the persons concerned" 
is another example of a provision for a declaratory judgment. See Kitzman 
v. Kitzman, 167 Wis. 3o8. 
(g) There are plenty of cases in the books where a stockholder has 
sued his corporation to enjoin its payment of a tax the claim being that the 
tax was invalid. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107; Corbus v. Gold 
Mining Co., 187 U. S. 459; Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U. S. 10. 
In such cases it is common for the party vitally interested, the Government, 
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to appear only informally as amicus curiae for the purpose of insuring a 
correct determination of· its rights. This type of proceeding is probably ex-
plained by Sec. 3224, Riw. STATS. forbidding a direct action to restrain the 
collection of a tax. 
In these cases the interests of the stockholder and the COrPOration are 
identical, there is no controversy, and the suit is merely a convenient form to 
secure a ju~icial ruling that the Government may or may not collect the tax. 
Under a more enlightened procedure the desired end would be accomplished 
by an action asking for a declaration of the rights and duties of the COrPOra-
tion as to such tax. So long as the suit is clothed in a familiar garb there is 
no objection, but if the legislature were to provide machinery whereby a 
corPoration in such position might ask an authoritative ruling in a direct 
uncamouflaged proceedirig, there would probably be a raising of judicial 
hands in horror at such Bolshevistic attempt (See opinion of Mr. Justice Fel-
lows) to make the courts the "official advisers of the people." 
(h) But the prettiest example of a case in which the final judgment is 
purely declaratory is to be found in the appeals by the state in criminal cases. 
See the discussion of this type of case supra 79. The objection to such 
proceedings is, in short, that they come after all is over. In the type of case 
under consideration, the principal case, the objection is that the court is asked 
to rule too soon. 
Other instances might be cited, but the ones above may fairly be said to 
show the way. R. W. A. 
